

# Huawei ATN Series Routers

## Security Target

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# 1 Introduction

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## 1.1 ST reference and TOE Reference

Name	Description
ST Title	Security Target of Huawei ATN Series Routers
ST version	1.7
Vendor and ST author	Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
TOE Name	Huawei ATN Series Routers
TOE Hardware Models	ATN 910C-M, ATN 910C-K and ATN 910D-B
TOE software version	V800R022C00SPC600

## 1.2 TOE overview

The Huawei ATN Series Routers TOE are used to satisfy the requirements for networks of various scales. They are deployed at the edge of MANs or at access sites that process heavy traffic to implement multi-service access. The TOE includes the hardware models as defined in Table 1-2 in section 1.3.

The TOE is comprised of several security features, as identified below:

- (1) Security audit
- (2) Cryptographic support
- (3) Identification and authentication
- (4) Secure Management
- (5) Protection of the TSF




- (6) TOE access through user authentication
- (7) Trusted path and channels for device authentication.

## 1.2.1 TOE usage

1. The TOE supports username/password, or public-key authentication mode and only users that are authenticated can access the TOE and its command line interface.
2. The TOE is accessed by CLI locally or a Network Management Server (NMS) remotely over SSH so that a secure channel is established to protect the data between TOE and NMS.
3. For secure transmission of audit information between the TOE and the Syslog server a secure TLS channel is used.
4. The TOE supports digital signature verification for software. Each of the software package or patch package released by Huawei includes a unique digital signature. When an NMS distributes the package to router, the TOE will verify the online digital signature before updating. The verification of the digital signature demonstrates the integrity and authenticity of the package. The package is only processed further after successful verification of the digital signature, otherwise the package will be discarded without processing.

The TOE provides security services onto a single and secure device. It supports (in some cases optionally) the following hardware, software, and firmware in its environment when the TOE is configured in Figure 1-1 (NMS: Network Management Server).

**Figure 1-1** IT Entities which connect with TOE



## 1.2.2 TOE type

The TOE type is a network device that is connected to the network and has an infrastructure role within the network.

## 1.2.3 Non TOE Hardware and Software

The TOE supports the following hardware, software, and firmware components in its operational environment. All of the following environment components are supported by all TOE evaluated configurations.

**Table 1-1 IT Environment Components**

Component	Required	Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance
Network Management Server	YES	This includes any Management workstation with a SSH client installed that is used to establish a protected channel with the TOE.
Local Console	YES	This includes any Console that is directly connected to the TOE via the Serial Console Port and is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration.
Syslog Server	YES	This includes any syslog server to which the TOE would transmit syslog messages.
Open PGP	YES	The Open PGP is used to verify the integrity of software package that is necessary to perform the installation of the TOE.

## 1.3 TOE description

The TOE is ATN Series Routers comprised of both software and hardware. The TOE scope consists of the software running in the router device. The hardware is comprise of the following: ATN 910C-M, ATN 910C-K and ATN 910D-B.

TSF relevant functions depend on software implementation. Table 1-2 below describes the models that have been claimed within this evaluation.

**Table 1-2 Hardware Scope**

Hardware	Configuration	Processor	Interface
ATN 910C-K	ATN 910C-K Integrated Chassis, Fixed interfaces.	ARM	Based on TOE's I/O modules
ATN 910C-M	ATN 910C-M Integrated Chassis, Fixed interfaces.	ARM	Based on TOE's I/O modules
ATN 910D-B	ATN 910D-B Integrated Chassis, Fixed interfaces.	ARM	Based on TOE's I/O modules

## **1.4 Physical scope**

This section will define the physical scope (table 1-3) of the Huawei ATN series routers to be evaluated.

**Table 1-3 Physical scope**

Type	Delivery Item	Version	Date
Hardware	ATN 910C-M, ATN 910C-K and ATN 910D-B The Hardware will be delivered by air, ship, train or automobile	NA	
Software	<p>ATN Router V800R022C00SPC600</p> <p>Format:</p> <p>ATN 910C-K: ATN910C-910D_V800R022C00SPC600.cc</p> <p>Info:</p> <p>Users can login the HUAWEI support website to download the software packet in accordance to the version of the TOE.</p> <p>Users can verify the software by digital signature(The digital signature is also published on HUAWEI support website)</p> <p>ATN 910C-M: ATN910C-910D_V800R022C00SPC600.cc</p> <p>Info:</p> <p>Users can login the HUAWEI support website to download the software packet in accordance to the version of the TOE.</p> <p>Users can verify the software by digital signature(The digital signature is also published on HUAWEI support website)</p> <p>ATN 910D-B: ATN910C-910D_V800R022C00SPC600.cc</p> <p>Info:</p> <p>Users can login the HUAWEI support website to download the software packet in accordance to the version of the TOE.</p> <p>Users can verify the software by digital signature(The digital signature is also published on HUAWEI support website)</p>	V800R022C00SPC600	2022-11-12
Product guidance	<p>Huawei ATN Series Routers Operational user Guidance.pdf</p> <p>Info:</p> <p>The documentation is delivered by email.</p>	1.2	2022-12-01
	<p>Huawei ATN Series Routers Preparative Procedures.pdf</p> <p>Info:</p> <p>The documentation is delivered by email.</p>	1.3	2023-04-13
	<p>ATN 980C, 980B, 950D, 950C, 950B, 910C, 910D, 905 V800R022C00SPC600 Upgrade Guide.pdf</p> <p>Info:</p> <p>The documentation is delivered by email.</p>	1.1	2022-10-31
	<p>ATN 980C, 980B, 950D, 950C, 950B, 910D, 910C and 905 V800R022C00 Product Documentation Info:</p> <p>Users can obtain documents from Huawei engineers by email. The document format is *.hdx.</p>	1.0	2022-11-23

## 1.5 Logical Scope of the TOE

The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.

### (1) Security audit

The log module of the host software records operations on a device and events that occur to a device. The recorded operations and events are log messages. Log messages provide evidence for diagnosing and maintaining a system. Log messages reflect the operating status of a device and are used to analyze the conditions of a network and to find out the causes of network failure or faults.

Key elements of log messages include timestamp, host name, Huawei identity, version, module name, severity, brief description, etc.

IC component are the module processing, outputting log records. Information hierarchy is designed to help the user roughly differentiate between information about normal operation and information about faults. Since the information center needs to output information to the terminal, console, log buffer, and log file.

### (2) Cryptographic support

The TOE provides cryptography in support of secure connections that includes remote administrative management.

The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are described in table below.

**Table 1-4 Cryptography provided by TOE**

<b>Cryptography Function</b>	<b>Use in the TOE</b>
DRBG	Used in session establishment of TLS and SSH
ECDSA	Used in the authentication of SSH
ECDH	Used in session establishment of SSH
RSA	Used in the authentication of TLS
DHE	Used in session establishment of TLS
SHA	Used to provide cryptographic hashing services
HMAC-SHA	Used to provide integrity and authentication verification
AES	Used to encrypt traffic transmitted through TLS and SSH

### (3) Identification and authentication

The authentication functionality provides validation by user's account name and password. Public key authentication is supported for SSH users. Detailed functionalities, for example max idle-timeout period, max log-in attempts, UI lock, user kick out, can be applied by administrator according to networking environment, customized security considerations, differential user role on TOE, and/or other operational concerns.

### (4) Secure Management

The TOE restricts the ability to determine the behavior of and modify the behavior of the functions

transmission of audit data to the security administrator. Only the security administrator can manage the cryptographic keys. Only the security administrator has the right of opening/closing the security services and creation/deletion/modification of the user accounts.

(5) Protection of the TSF

The TOE protects the pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys from reading them by an unauthorized entity. The TOE stores the users or administrator passwords in non-plaintext form preventing them from reading. The TOE verifies the packet before their installation and uses the digital signature.

(6) TOE access through user authentication

The TOE provides communication security by implementing SSH protocol.

To protect the TOE from eavesdrop and to ensure data transmission security and confidentiality, SSH implements:

- authentication by password or by public-key;
- AES encryption algorithms;
- secure cryptographic key exchange;
- Besides default TCP port 22, manually specifying a listening port is also implemented since it can effectively reduce attacks.

(7) Trusted path and channels for device authentication

The TOE supports the trusted connections using TLS for the communication with the audit server.

## 1.6 Standalone TOE

[CPP\_ND], chapter 3 introduces distributed TOEs, i.e. TOEs that consist of more than one component. This does not refer to different software components running on one hardware component but same version software components running on each hardware components.

This ST refers to a standalone TOE which is not a distributed TOE in the sense of [CPP\_ND], chapter 3. All additional requirements that are defined for distributed TOEs within [CPP\_ND] are therefore ignored in this ST. There are dedicated paragraphs in several Application Notes of [CPP\_ND] which are only applicable to distributed TOEs. These dedicated paragraphs have not been integrated into the Application Notes in this ST since the TOE is not a distributed TOE.

# 2

## PP conformance claims

### 2.1 CC Conformance Claim

As defined by the references [CC1], [CC2] and [CC3], this ST:

- conforms to the requirements of Common Criteria v3.1, Revision 5
- is Part 2 extended, Part 3 conformant
- does not claim conformance to any other PP than the one specified in chap 2.2
- does not claim conformance to any Evaluation Assurance Level as defined in [CC3], chap. 8.

### 2.2 Protection Profile Conformance

This security target claims “Exact Conformance” to [CPP\_ND]. Note that "Exact Conformance" is defined in [CPP\_ND], chap. 2.

The methodology applied for the cPP evaluation is defined in [CEM]. In addition to [CEM], the evaluation activities for [CPP\_ND] are completed in [SD\_ND].

The assurance package applicable to this ST is defined in [CPP\_ND] as follows:

**Table 2-1 Assurance Package**

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Security Target (ASE)	Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
	Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
	ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
	Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1)
	Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
	Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
	TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV)	Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance documents	Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
(AGD)	Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life cycle support (ALC)	Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
	TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Tests (ATE)	Independent testing – sample (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability assessment (AVA)	Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)

## 2.3 Conformance Rationale

### 2.3.1 TOE Appropriateness

The TOE provides all of the functionality at a level of security commensurate with that identified in the [CPP\_ND].

### 2.3.2 TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency

The Threats, Assumptions, and Organization Security Policies included in the Security Target represent the Threats, Assumptions, and Organization Security Policies specified in [CPP\_ND] for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the collaborative Protection Profile Security Problem Definition are included in the Security Target.

### 2.3.3 Statement of Security Objectives Consistency

The security objectives included in the security target represent the security objectives specified in [CPP\_ND] for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in Protection Profile's Statement of security objectives are included in the Security Target.

### 2.3.4 Statement of Security Requirements Consistency

The Security Functional Requirements included in the Security Target represent the Security Functional Requirements specified in the [CPP\_ND] for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered the Protection Profile's Statement of Security Requirements are included in the Security Target. Additionally, the Security Assurance Requirements included in the Security Target are identical to the Security Assurance Requirements included in section 6 of the [CPP\_ND].



# 3

## Security Problem Definition

### 3.1 Assets

The owner of the TOE presumably places value upon the following entities as long as they are in the scope of the TOE.

Table 3-1 TOE Assets

Asset Name	Description
Audit data	The data which is provided during security audit logging. TOE Security characteristic: integrity.
Authentication data	The data which is used to identify and authenticate the external entities such as account, password, certificate, etc. TOE Security characteristic: confidentiality, integrity.
Cryptography data	The data which is used for digital signature and encryption/decryption such as key. TOE Security characteristic: confidentiality, integrity.
Management data	The data which is used for software updates, and software integrity checking. TOE Security characteristic: integrity.
Configuration data	TOE Security characteristic: integrity.
Software &firm ware	device firmware; software; TOE Security characteristic: integrity.
Critical network traffic	Administration traffic; Authentication traffic containing Authentication data; Audit traffic; traffic containing cryptography data; traffic containing Management data TOE Security characteristic: confidentiality, integrity.
Security Functionality of the Device	The TOE Security Functions (TSF) (Remark: In the context of this ST the Security Functionality of the device refers to the security functions of the TOE). TOE Security characteristic: integrity.

Network on which the device resides	The network on which the device resides. TOE Security characteristic: integrity.
Network device	The network device itself. TOE Security characteristic: integrity.
Trust relations with other network devices	Trust relations of the TOE with other network devices. TOE Security characteristic: integrity, authenticity.

## 3.2 Threats

The threats for the Network Device are grouped according to functional areas of the device in the sections below.

### 3.2.1 T.UNAUTHORIZED\_ADMINISTRATOR\_ACCESS

Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the Network Device by nefarious means such as masquerading as an Administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session, or sessions between Network Devices. Successfully gaining Administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise the security functionality of the device and the network on which it resides.

SFR Rationale:

- The Administrator role is defined in FMT\_SMR.2 and the relevant administration capabilities are defined in FMT\_SMF.1 and FMT\_MTD.1/CoreData, with optional additional capabilities in FMT\_MOF.1/Services and FMT\_MOF.1/Functions
- The actions allowed before authentication of an Administrator are constrained by FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1, and include the advisory notice and consent warning message displayed according to FTA\_TAB.1
- The requirement for the Administrator authentication process is described in FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2
- Locking of Administrator sessions is ensured by FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1 (for local sessions), FTA\_SSL.3 (for remote sessions), and FTA\_SSL.4 (for all interactive sessions)
- The secure channel used for remote Administrator connections is specified in FTP\_TRP.1/Admin
- (Malicious actions carried out from an Administrator session are separately addressed by T.UNDETECTED\_ACTIVITY)
- (Protection of the Administrator credentials is separately addressed by T.PASSWORD\_CRACKING).

### 3.2.2 T.WEAK\_CRYPTOGRAPHY

Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.

SFR Rationale:

- Requirements for key generation and key distribution are set in FCS\_CKM.1 and FCS\_CKM.2 respectively
- Requirements for use of cryptographic schemes are set in FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption, FCS\_COP.1/SigGen, FCS\_COP.1/Hash, and FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash
- Requirements for random bit generation to support key generation and secure protocols (see SFRs resulting from T.UNTRUSTED\_COMMUNICATION\_CHANNELS) are set in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1
- Management of cryptographic functions is specified in FMT\_SMF.1

### 3.2.3 T.UNTRUSTED\_COMMUNICATION\_CHANNELS

Threat agents may attempt to target Network Devices that do not use standardized secure tunneling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the Network Device itself.

SFR Rationale:

- The general use of secure protocols for identified communication channels is described at the top level in FTP\_ITC.1 and FTP\_TRP.1/Admin
- Requirements for the use of secure communication protocols are set for all the allowed protocols in FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1, FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1, FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1
- Optional and selection-based requirements for use of public key certificates to support secure protocols are defined in FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/Rev, FIA\_X509\_EXT.2

### 3.2.4 T.WEAK\_AUTHENTICATION\_ENDPOINTS

Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints, e.g. a shared password that is guessable or transported as plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the Administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the Network Device itself could be compromised.

SFR Rationale:

- The use of appropriate secure protocols to provide authentication of endpoints (as in the SFRs addressing T.UNTRUSTED\_COMMUNICATION\_CHANNELS) are ensured by the requirements in FTP\_ITC.1 and FTP\_TRP.1/Admin

### 3.2.5 T.UPDATE\_COMPROMISE

Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firmware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.

SFR Rationale:

- Requirements for protection of updates are set in FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1
- Certificate-based protection of signatures is supported by the X.509 certificate processing requirements in FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/Rev, FIA\_X509\_EXT.2

- Requirements for management of updates are defined in FMT\_SMF.1 and (for manual updates) in FMT\_MOF.1/ManualUpdate

### 3.2.6 T.UNDETECTED\_ACTIVITY

Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality of the Network Device without Administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise the device and the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been compromised.

SFR Rationale:

- Requirements for basic auditing capabilities are specified in FAU\_GEN.1 and FAU\_GEN.2, with timestamps provided according to FPT\_STM\_EXT.1
- Requirements for protecting audit records stored on the TOE are specified in FAU\_STG.1
- Requirements for secure transmission of local audit records to an external IT entity via a secure channel are specified in FAU\_STG\_EXT.1
- Additional requirements for dealing with potential loss of locally stored audit records are specified in FAU\_STG\_EXT.3/LocSpace
- Configuration of the audit functionality is specified in FMT\_SMF.1 and confining this functionality to Security Administrators is required by FMT\_MOF.1/Functions.

### 3.2.7 T.SECURITY\_FUNCTIONALITY\_COMPROMISE

Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access to the Network Device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials includes replacing existing credentials with an attacker's credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.

SFR Rationale:

- Protection of secret/private keys against compromise is specified in FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1
- Secure destruction of keys is specified in FCS\_CKM.4
- Management of keys is specified in FMT\_SMF.1 and confining this functionality to Security Administrators is required by FMT\_MTD.1/CryptoKeys
- (Protection of passwords is separately covered under T.PASSWORD\_CRACKING)

### 3.2.8 T.PASSWORD\_CRACKING

Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic and may allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships with other Network Devices.

SFR Rationale:

- Requirements for password lengths and available characters are set in FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1
- Protection of password entry by providing only obscured feedback is specified in FIA\_UAU.7
- Actions on reaching a threshold number of consecutive password failures are specified in FIA\_AFL.1
- Requirements for secure storage of passwords are set in FPT\_APW\_EXT.1.

### 3.2.9 T.SECURITY\_FUNCTIONALITY\_FAILURE

An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or compromised security functionality and might therefore subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical network traffic or security functionality of the device.

SFR Rationale:

- Requirements for running self-test(s) are defined in FPT\_TST\_EXT.1

## 3.3 Assumptions

This section describes the assumptions made in identification of the threats and security requirements for Network Devices. The Network Device is not expected to provide assurance in any of these areas, and as a result, requirements are not included to mitigate the threats associated.

### 3.3.1 A.PHYSICAL\_PROTECTION

The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security or interfere with the device's physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the ST does not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The ST does not expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device.

[OE.PHYSICAL]

### 3.3.2 A.LIMITED\_FUNCTIONALITY

The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).

[OE.NO\_GENERAL\_PURPOSE]

### 3.3.3 A.NO\_THRU\_TRAFFIC\_PROTECTION

A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the Network Device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the Network Device, destined for another network entity, is not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of Network Devices (e.g., firewall).

[OE.NO\_THRU\_TRAFFIC\_PROTECTION]

### 3.3.4 A.TRUSTED\_ADMINISTRATOR

The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.

[OE.TRUSTED\_ADMIN]

### 3.3.5 A.REGULAR\_UPDATES

The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.

[OE.UPDATES]

### 3.3.6 A.ADMIN\_CREDENTIALS\_SECURE

The Administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the Network Device are protected by the platform on which they reside.

[OE.ADMIN\_CREDENTIALS\_SECURE]

### 3.3.7 A.RESIDUAL\_INFORMATION

The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.

[OE.RESIDUAL\_INFORMATION]

## 3.4 Organizational Security Policies

An organizational security policy is a set of rules, practices, and procedures imposed by an organization to address its security needs.

### 3.4.1 P.ACCESS\_BANNER

The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the TOE.

SFR Rationale:

- An advisory notice and consent warning message is required to be displayed by FTA\_TAB.1



# 4

## Security Objectives

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### 4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The following subsections describe security objectives for the Operational Environment.

#### 4.1.1 OE.PHYSICAL

Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is provided by the environment.

#### 4.1.2 OE.NO\_GENERAL\_PURPOSE

There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE.

#### 4.1.3 OE.NO\_THRU\_TRAFFIC\_PROTECTION

The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by other security and assurance measures in the operational environment.

#### 4.1.4 OE.TRUSTED\_ADMIN

Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance documentation in a trusted manner.

For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are assumed to monitor the revocation status of all certificates in the TOE's trust store and to remove any certificate from the TOE's trust store in case such certificate can no longer be trusted.

#### 4.1.5 OE.UPDATES

The TOE firmware and software is updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.



### **4.1.6 OE.ADMIN\_CREDENTIALS\_SECURE**

The Administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the TOE must be protected on any other platform on which they reside.

### **4.1.7 OE.RESIDUAL\_INFORMATION**

The Security Administrator ensures that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.

# 5

## Extended Components Definition

The extended components used in this ST are defined in [CPP\_ND]. The following table provide a chapter specific reference in which chapter of each of the extended components is defined.

**Table 5-1 Definition of Extended Components - references to [CPP\_ND]**

Extended Component	Drawn From
<b>Mandatory Requirements</b>	
FAU_STG_EXT.1	NDcPP C.1.2.1
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	NDcPP C.2.1.1
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	NDcPP C 3.1.1
FIA_UIA_EXT.1	NDcPP C 3.2.1
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	NDcPP C 3.3.1
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	NDcPP C 4.1.1
FPT_APW_EXT.1	NDcPP C 4.2.1
FPT_TST_EXT.1	NDcPP C.4.3.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	NDcPP C 4.4.1
FPT_STM_EXT.1	NDcPP C 4.5.1
FTA_SSL_EXT.1	NDcPP C 5.1.1
<b>Optional Requirements</b>	
FAU_STG_EXT.3/LocSpace	NDcPP C 1.2.3
<b>Selection-Based Requirements</b>	
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1	NDcPP C 2.2.6
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	NDcPP C 2.2.7
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	NDcPP C 2.2.8
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	NDcPP C 3.4.1
FIA_X509_EXT.2	NDcPP C 3.4.2

# 6

## Security Functional Requirements

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### Conventions

The conventions used in descriptions of the SFRs are as follows:

- Unaltered SFRs are stated in the form used in [CC2] or their extended component definition (ECD);
- Refinement made in the cPP and ST: the refinement text is indicated with **bold text** and ~~strikethroughs~~;
- Selection wholly or partially completed in the cPP and ST: the selection values (i.e. the selection values adopted in the cPP or the remaining selection values available for the ST) are indicated with underlined text  
e.g. “[selection: *disclosure, modification, loss of use*]” in [CC2] or an ECD might become “disclosure” (completion) or “[selection: disclosure, modification]” (partial completion) in the PP;
- Assignment wholly or partially completed in the cPP and ST: indicated with *italicized text*;
- Assignment completed within a selection in the cPP and ST: the completed assignment text is indicated with *italicized and underlined text*  
e.g. “[selection: *change\_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]*]” in [CC2] or an ECD might become “change\_default, select\_tag” (completion of both selection and assignment) or “[selection: change\_default, select\_tag, select\_value]” (partial completion of selection, and completion of assignment) in the PP;
- Iteration: indicated by adding a string starting with “/” (e.g. “FCS\_COP.1/Hash”), or by appending the iteration number in parenthesis, e.g. (1), (2), (3).
- Application Notes added by the ST author are called 'Additional Application Note' which are enumerated as 'a', 'b', ... and are formatted with underline such as “Additional Application Note a”;
- References: Indicated with [square brackets].

## 6.1 Functional Security Requirements

### 6.1.1 Security Audit (FAU)

#### 6.1.1.1 FAU\_GEN.1 Audit data generation

FAU\_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
- b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
- c) *All administrative actions comprising:*
  - *Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user accounts are required for administrators).*
  - *Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).*
  - *Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).*
  - *Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).*
  - *Starting and stopping services.*
- d) *Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 6-1.*

Additional Application Note a: Audit functionality is enabled by default. The auditing functionality cannot be disabled.

Additional Application Note b: The TOE does not support using reset command to reset password directly, but it can modify password in the following way: re-create local-user or change local-user password.

FAU\_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, *information specified in column three of Table 6-1.*

**Table 6-1 Security Functional Requirements and Auditable Events**

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
<b>Mandatory Requirements</b>		
FAU_GEN.1	None.	None.
FAU_GEN.2	None.	None.
FAU_STG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FCS_CKM.1	None.	None.
FCS_CKM.2	None.	None.
FCS_CKM.4	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/Hash	None.	None.

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	None.	None.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FIA_AFL.1	Unsuccessful login attempts limit is met or exceeded.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1	All use of the identification and authentication mechanism.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	All use of the identification and authentication mechanism.	Origin of the attempt (e.g. IP address).
FIA_UAU.7	None.	None.
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	Any attempt to initiate a manual update	None.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	None.	None.
FMT_SMF.1	All management activities of TSF data.	None.
FMT_SMR.2	None.	None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_TST_EXT.1	None.	None
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Initiation of update; result of the update attempt (success or failure).	None
FPT_STM_EXT.1	Discontinuous changes to time - either Administrator actuated or changed via an automated process. (Note that no continuous changes to time need to be logged.)	For discontinuous changes to time: The old and new values for the time. Origin of the attempt to change time for success and failure (e.g. IP address).
FTA_SSL_EXT.1	The termination of a local session by the session locking mechanism.	None.
FTA_SSL.3	The termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism.	None.
FTA_SSL.4	The termination of an interactive session.	None
FTA_TAB.1	None.	None.
FPT_ITC.1	Initiation of the trusted channel. Termination of the trusted channel. Failure of the trusted channel functions.	Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin	Initiation of the trusted path. Termination of the trusted path. Failures of the trusted path functions.	None
<b>Optional Requirements</b>		
FAU_STG.1	None.	None.
FAU_STG_EXT.3/LocSpace	Low storage space for audit	None.

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
	events.	
<b>Selection-Based Requirements</b>		
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH session.	Reason for failure.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH session.	Reason for failure.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	Failure to establish a TLS Session.	Reason for failure.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	Unsuccessful attempt to validate a certificate. Any addition, replacement or removal of trust anchors in the TOE's trust store	Reason for failure of certificate validation Identification of certificates added, replaced or removed as trust anchor in the TOE's trust store.
FIA_X509_EXT.2	None.	None.
FMT_MOF.1/Services	Starting and stopping of services.	None.
FMT_MOF.1/Functions	Modification of the behaviour of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity, the handling of audit data, the audit functionality when Local Audit Storage Space is full.	None.
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys	Management of cryptographic keys.	None.

### 6.1.1.2 FAU\_GEN.2 User identity association

FAU\_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

### 6.1.1.3 FAU\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage

FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP\_ITC.1.

FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself. In addition The TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally.

FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: overwrite the oldest log information always when the local storage space for audit data is full.

#### 6.1.1.4 FAU\_STG\_EXT.3/LocSpace Action in case of possible audit data loss

FAU\_STG\_EXT.3.1/LocSpace The TSF shall *generate a warning to inform the Administrator* before the audit trail *exceeds the local audit trail storage capacity*.

#### 6.1.1.5 FAU\_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

FAU\_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.

FAU\_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

### 6.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

#### 6.1.2.1 FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (Refinement)

FCS\_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate **asymmetric** cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm:

- FFC schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.1
- ECC schemes using “NIST curves” P-256, P-384, P-521 that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4;

~~and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].~~

#### 6.1.2.2 FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refinement)

FCS\_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall **perform** cryptographic **key establishment** in accordance with a specified cryptographic key **establishment** method:

- Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”;
- Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”;

that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].

#### 6.1.2.3 FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

FCS\_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method:

- *For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a single overwrite consisting of zeroes;*

- *For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that*
  - logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a single overwrite consisting of a new value of the key

that meets the following: *No Standard*.

#### 6.1.2.4 FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/ Decryption)

FCS\_COP.1.1/DataEncryption The TSF shall perform *encryption/decryption* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm *AES used in CTR, GCM mode* and cryptographic key sizes 128 bits, 256 bits that meet the following: *AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, CTR as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772*.

#### 6.1.2.5 FCS\_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)

FCS\_COP.1.1/SigGen The TSF shall perform *cryptographic signature services (generation and verification)* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm:

- RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus): 3072 bits and 4096 bits,
- Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes: 256 bits, 384 bits and 521 bits

that meet the following:

- For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1\_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3.
- For ECDSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing “NIST curves”: P-256, P-384 and P-521; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4

#### 6.1.2.6 FCS\_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)

FCS\_COP.1.1/Hash The TSF shall perform *cryptographic hashing services* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: SHA-256, SHA-384, and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] and message digest sizes 256, 384 bits that meet the following: *ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004*.

#### 6.1.2.7 FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)

FCS\_COP.1.1/KeyedHash The TSF shall perform *keyed-hash message authentication* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: HMAC-SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes: 256 bits for HMAC-SHA-256 and message digest sizes: 256 bits that meet the following: *ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”*.



### 6.1.2.8 FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using Hash DRBG (any).

FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from 1 platform-based noise source with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

### 6.1.2.9 FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1 SSH Client Protocol

FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFC(s) 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 4256, 4344, 5647, 5656, 6668.

FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following user authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, password-based.

FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than 262144 bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, AEAD\_AES\_128\_GCM, AEAD\_AES\_256\_GCM, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes256-gcm@openssh.com.

FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.

FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses hmac-sha2-256, AEAD\_AES\_128\_GCM, AEAD\_AES\_256\_GCM, implicit as its data integrity MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).

FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that ecdh-sha2-nistp256 and no other methods are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.

FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.

FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH client authenticates the identity of the SSH server using a local database associating each host name with its corresponding public key and no other methods as described in RFC 4251 section 4.1.

### 6.1.2.10 FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol

FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFC(s) 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 4256, 4344, 5647, 5656, 6668.

FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following user authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, password-based.

FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than 262144 bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, AEAD AES 128 GCM, AEAD AES 256 GCM, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes256-gcm@openssh.com.

FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.

FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses hmac-sha2-256, AEAD AES 128 GCM, AEAD AES 256 GCM, implicit as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).

FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that ecdh-sha2-nistp256 *and* no other methods are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.

FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.

### 6.1.2.11 FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication

FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:

- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288

and no other ciphersuites

FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier per RFC 6125 section 6.

FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.3 When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also Not implement any administrator override mechanism.

FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall not present the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client Hello

## 6.1.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

### 6.1.3.1 FIA\_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management (Refinement)

FIA\_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within 3 to 5 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to *Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely using a password.*

FIA\_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing a remote session using any authentication method that involves a password until action to unlock is taken by an Administrator; prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing a remote session using any authentication method that involves a password until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed.

### 6.1.3.2 FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1 Password Management

FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:

- a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: “!”, “@”, “#”, “\$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “\*”, “(”, “)”, “-”, “+”, “=”, “[”, “]”, “{”, “}”, “|”, “\”, “.”, “,”, “/”, “<”, “>”, “:”, “;”, “'”, “”.
- b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between 8 and 128 characters.

### 6.1.3.3 FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication

FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the identification and authentication process:

- Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA\_TAB.1;
- ICMP echo.

FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.

### 6.1.3.4 FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism

FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local password-based authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user authentication.

### 6.1.3.5 FIA\_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback

FIA\_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only *obscured feedback* to the administrative user while the authentication is in progress **at the local console**.

### 6.1.3.6 FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation

FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1/Rev The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation **supporting a minimum path length of three certificates**.
- The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.
- The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
- The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3.
- The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
  - *Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.*
  - *Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.*
  - *Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.*

- *OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.*

FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.2/Rev The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

### 6.1.3.7 FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for TLS and no additional uses.

FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.2 When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall not accept the certificate.

## 6.1.4 Security Management (FMT)

### 6.1.4.1 FMT\_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behaviour

FMT\_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual updates to Security Administrators.

### 6.1.4.2 FMT\_MOF.1/Functions Management of security functions behaviour

FMT\_MOF.1.1/Functions The TSF shall restrict the ability to determine the behaviour of, modify the behaviour of the functions transmission of audit data to an external IT entity to *Security Administrators*.

### 6.1.4.3 FMT\_MOF.1/Services Management of security functions behaviour

FMT\_MOF.1.1/Services The TSF shall restrict the ability to **start and stop** ~~the function~~ **services** to *Security Administrators*.

### 6.1.4.4 FMT\_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data

FMT\_MTD.1.1/CoreData The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the *TSF data* to *Security Administrators*.

### 6.1.4.5 FMT\_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF data

FMT\_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the *cryptographic keys* to *Security Administrators*.

### 6.1.4.6 FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

FMT\_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- *Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;*

- *Ability to configure the access banner;*
- *Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;*
- *Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to installing those updates;*
- *Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA\_AFL.1;*
- Ability to start and stop services;
- Ability to configure audit behaviour (e.g. changes to storage locations for audit; changes to behaviour when local audit storage space is full);
- Ability to manage the cryptographic keys;
- Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
- Ability to re-enable an Administrator account;
- Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
- Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors;
- Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store;
- Ability to manage the trusted public keys database;
- No other capabilities.

#### 6.1.4.7 FMT\_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles

FMT\_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:

- *Security Administrator.*

FMT\_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FMT\_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions:

- *The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;*
- *The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely*

are satisfied.

### 6.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

#### 6.1.5.1 FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)

FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.

#### 6.1.5.2 FPT\_APW\_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords

FPT\_APW\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store passwords in non-plaintext form.

FPT\_APW\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext passwords.

### 6.1.5.3 FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 TSF Testing (Extended)

FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: *integrity of the firmware and software (software integrity check), the correct operation of cryptographic functions.*

### 6.1.5.4 FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 Trusted Update

FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide *Security Administrators* the ability to query the currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software and the most recently installed version of the TOE firmware/software.

FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide *Security Administrators* the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and no other update mechanism.

FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a digital signature prior to installing those updates.

### 6.1.5.5 FPT\_STM\_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps

FPT\_STM\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.

FPT\_STM\_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall allow the Security Administrator to set the time.

## 6.1.6 TOE Access (FTA)

### 6.1.6.1 FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking

FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions,

- terminate the session

after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.

### 6.1.6.2 FTA\_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination (Refinement)

FTA\_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate a **remote** interactive session after a *Security Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity*.

### 6.1.6.3 FTA\_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination (Refinement)

FTA\_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow **Administrator**-initiated termination of the **Administrator's** own interactive session.

### 6.1.6.4 FTA\_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners (Refinement)

FTA\_TAB.1.1 Before establishing an **administrative user** session the TSF shall display a **Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent** warning message regarding use of the TOE.

## 6.1.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)

### 6.1.7.1 FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel (Refinement)

FTP\_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall **be capable of using TLS** to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and **authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, no other capabilities** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from **disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data**.

FTP\_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit **the TSF or the authorized IT entities** to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP\_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for *Syslog server over TLS*.

### 6.1.7.2 FTP\_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path (Refinement)

FTP\_TRP.1.1/Admin The TSF shall **be capable of using SSH** to provide a communication path between itself and **authorized remote Administrators** that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from **disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data**.

FTP\_TRP.1.2/Admin The TSF shall permit **remote Administrators** to initiate communication via the trusted path.

FTP\_TRP.1.3/Admin The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for *initial Administrator authentication and all remote administration actions*.

## 6.2 Assurance Security Requirements

The development and the evaluation of the TOE shall be done in accordance to the following security assurance requirements:

**Table 6-2 Security Assurance Requirements**

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Security Target (ASE)	Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
	Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
	ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
	Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1)
	Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
	Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
	TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Development (ADV)	Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance documents (AGD)	Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
	Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life cycle support (ALC)	Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
	TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Tests (ATE)	Independent testing – sample (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability assessment (AVA)	Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)

This security target claims conformance with [CPP\_ND]. In addition to [CEM], the evaluation activities for [CPP\_ND] are completed in [SD\_ND].

## 6.3 SFR Rationale

The following table lists all SFRs contained in ST together with the classification whether they are mandatory, optional or selection-based, indicates which are included in this ST and provides a dependency rationale. Justifications for any unsupported dependencies will be given in the table as well.

**Table 6-3 Dependency rationale for SFRs**

Requirement	Dependencies	Satisfied by
<b>Mandatory Requirements</b>		
FAU_GEN.1	FPT_STM.1	FPT_STM_EXT.1 included (which is hierarchic to FPT_STM.1)
FAU_GEN.2	FAU_GEN.1; FIA_UID.1	FAU_GEN.1; Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant Administrator identification timing
FAU_STG_EXT.1	FAU_GEN.1; FTP_ITC.1	FAU_GEN.1; FTP_ITC.1
FCS_CKM.1	FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1; FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.2; FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.2	FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 (also FTP_ITC.1 as a secure channel that could be used for import); FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4	FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1	FCS_CKM.1 (also FTP_ITC.1 as a secure channel that could be used for import)
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or	FCS_CKM.1 (also



Requirement	Dependencies	Satisfied by
	FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4	FTP_ITC.1 as a secure channel that could be used for import); FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 (also FTP_ITC.1 as a secure channel that could be used for import); FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/Hash	FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4	Unsupported Dependencies: This SFR specifies keyless hashing operations, so initialisation and destruction of keys are not relevant
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 (also FTP_ITC.1 as a secure channel that could be used for import); FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	None	N/A
FIA_AFL.1	FIA_UAU.1	Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant Administrator authentication
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	None	N/A
FIA_UIA_EXT.1	FTA_TAB.1	FTA_TAB.1
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	None	N/A
FIA_UAU.7	FIA_UAU.1	Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant Administrator authentication
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.2; FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.2; FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1	None	N/A
FMT_SMR.2	FIA_UID.1	Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant Administrator identification
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	None	N/A
FPT_APW_EXT.1	None	N/A
FPT_TST_EXT.1	None	N/A
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	FCS_COP.1/SigGen or FCS_COP.1/Hash	FCS_COP.1/SigGen and FCS_COP.1/Hash
FPT_STM_EXT.1	None	N/A
FTA_SSL_EXT.1	FIA_UAU.1	Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant Administrator identification
FTA_SSL.3	None	N/A
FTA_SSL.4	None	N/A
FTA_TAB.1	None	N/A
FTP_ITC.1	None	N/A
FTP_TRP.1/Admin	None	N/A
<b>Optional Requirements</b>		

Requirement	Dependencies	Satisfied by
FAU_STG.1	FAU_STG.3	FAU_STG_EXT.3/LocSpace
FAU_STG_EXT.3/LocSpace	FAU_STG.1	FAU_STG.1
<b>Selection-Based Requirements</b>		
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1	FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.2; FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption; FCS_COP.1/SigGen; FCS_COP.1/Hash; FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash; FCS_RBG_EXT.1:	FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.2; FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption; FCS_COP.1/SigGen; FCS_COP.1/Hash; FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash; FCS_RBG_EXT.1:
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.2; FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption; FCS_COP.1/SigGen; FCS_COP.1/Hash; FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash; FCS_RBG_EXT.1:	FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.2; FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption; FCS_COP.1/SigGen; FCS_COP.1/Hash; FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash; FCS_RBG_EXT.1:
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.2; FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption; FCS_COP.1/SigGen; FCS_COP.1/Hash; FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash; FCS_RBG_EXT.1:	FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.2; FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption; FCS_COP.1/SigGen; FCS_COP.1/Hash; FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash; FCS_RBG_EXT.1:
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	FIA_X509_EXT.2;	FIA_X509_EXT.2;
FIA_X509_EXT.2	FIA_X509_EXT.1;	FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev;
FMT_MOF.1/Services	FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.2; FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MOF.1/Functions	FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.2; FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys	FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.2; FMT_SMF.1

# 7

## TOE Summary Specification

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### 7.1 Security Audit (FAU)

#### 7.1.1 FAU\_GEN.1 Audit data generation

The TOE generates an audit record whenever an audited event occurs. The types of events that cause audit records to be generated include identification and authentication related events, and administrative events (the specific events and the contents of each audit record are listed in the table within the FAU\_GEN.1 SFR, “Table 6-1 Security Functional Requirements and Auditable Events”). Each of the events specified in the audit record is in enough detail to identify the user for which the event is associated (e.g. user identity, MAC address, IP address), when the event occurred, where the event occurred, the outcome of the event, and the type of event that occurred.

The audit trail consists of the individual audit records; one audit record for each event that occurred. The audit record contains a lot of information, such as the type of event that occurred, and two percent signs (%%), which follows the device name. As noted above, the information includes at least all of the required information. Additional information can be configured and included if desired.

Administrators have the ability to execute CLI commands to generate/import of/delete cryptographic keys, each command will generate a log and will be stored in log file. The log contains the user name and IP address. The log does not contain the generated key information.

#### 7.1.2 FAU\_GEN.2 User identity association

Each auditable event is associated with the user that triggered the event and as a result, they are traceable to a specific user. For example, a human user, user identity or related session ID would be included in the audit record. For an IT entity or device, the IP address, MAC address, host name, or other configured identification is presented.

The security log of user account management should include user name. Other types of security log have other rules about the information.

### 7.1.3 FAU\_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

Only authorized administrators can monitor the logfile record, and operate the log files. The unauthorized users have no access rights to perform these actions. All actions of the authorized administrators will be logged. The default maximum size is 8 MB for a common log file, 4 MB for a security log file, and 4 MB for an operation log file.

### 7.1.4 FAU\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected audit event storage

The TOE supports the export of syslog records to a specified, external syslog server. The TOE protects communications with an external syslog server via TLS. The TOE stores audit records on flash memory whenever it is connected with syslog server or not. The transmission of audit information to an external syslog server can be done in real-time.

The size of an information file is configurable by the administrator with value 4M/8M/16M/32M bytes. The default maximum size of each information file is 8 MB. When the size of an information file exceeds the configured maximum size, the information file is compressed into a smaller file in standard log\_slot ID\_time.log.zip format. The maximum quantity of compressed files is configurable by the administrator with a value ranging from 3 to 500. A maximum of 200 files can be stored on a device by default. The unauthorized users are disallowed to handle the audit records.

The logs are saved to flash memory so records can't be lost in case of failures or restarts. The log buffer is circular, so newer messages overwrite older messages after the buffer is full. Administrators are instructed to monitor the log buffer using the show logging privileged CLI command to view the audit records. The first message displayed is the oldest message in the buffer. There are other associated commands to clear the buffer, to reset log buffer, etc. The size of the log buffer can be configured by users with sufficient privileges.

When the local audit data stored in flash memory exceeds the maximum allowed size of log file storage, it will always overwrite the oldest log information.

An administrator cannot alter audit records but can delete audit records as a whole.

### 7.1.5 FAU\_STG\_EXT.3/LocSpace Action in case of possible audit data loss

If the log files have already occupied more than 80% of the total audit storage in CF card, or delete

the old log files after saving them to the other storage device, an event will be generated and sent to management server to notice the clients of the warning information.

If the number of compressed log files generated in the system exceeded 80% of the maximum number of compressed files, an event will also be generated to notice NMS the warning information.

If the number of recorded compressed files reach the maximum number that the security administrator has configured, or the storage with audit events reach the configured storage size, another event will be generated to notice NMS.

## 7.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

### 7.2.1 FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

The TOE supports

- 1) FFC schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 3072-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.1. The FFC schemes is used for TLS.
- 2) ECC schemes using “NIST curves” P-256, P-384, P-521 that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4. The ECC schemes is used for SSH.

### 7.2.2 FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

The TOE supports Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”. The key size supports at least 256 bits. The TOE establishes a SSH connection based on Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes. The Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes is used when the TOE establishes SSH connection.

The TOE supports Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”. The key size supports at least 3072 bits. The Finite field-based key establishment schemes is used when the TOE establishes TLS connection.

Scheme	SFR	Service
DHE	FCS_TLSC_EXT.1	Audit
ECDH	FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	Administration

ECDH	FCS_SSHC_EXT.1	Administration
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## 7.2.3 FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

The private key stored in SDRAM is used to verify the integrity of the certificate. After the device is restarted, the private key is imported into the SDRAM from the CF card. The private key is encrypted by the AES key and stored on the CF card. Users and administrator cannot access the private key that is stored in the SDRAM and CF card.

**Table 7-1 Key Destructions**

Name	Description of Key	Storage	Key destruction method
SSH/TLS session key	The key is used for encrypting/decrypting the traffic in a secure connection.	SDRAM (plaintext)	Automatically after session terminated. Overwritten with: zeroes.
FFC key	The key is used for key establishment.	SDRAM (plaintext)	Automatically after completion of use of the key. Overwritten with: zeroes.
TLS private key	The key is used for signature and authentication.	CF card (AES256 cipher)	Overwritten by a command. Overwritten with: <u>a new value of the key</u> .
ECC key pair	The ECC key pair is used for digital signature. The ECC host key pair is imported into the SDRAM from the CF card, which is the ECC key pair.	SDRAM (plaintext)	Automatically after completion of use of the key. Overwritten with: zeroes.
ECC host key pair	Using command generate a ECC host key pair.	CF card (AES256 cipher)	Zeroized using “ecc local-key-pair destroy” command. Overwritten with: zeroes.
AES key	The AES key is generated by root key. AES key is used to encrypt ECC host key pair and TLS private key.  Note: The root key is generated by root key material. The root	SDRAM (plaintext)	The AES key is stored in the SDRAM temporarily and destroyed after used. Overwritten with: zeroes.

	key material is saved many places, for example: code.		
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## 7.2.4 FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/ Decryption)

The TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES as specified in ISO 18033-3 supporting the following modes:

- CTR mode as specified in ISO 10116.
- GCM mode as specified in ISO 19772.

The TOE uses AES in the following protocols:

- SSH: CTR mode with key sizes of 128 bits and 256 bits. GCM mode with key sizes of 128 bits and 256 bits.
- TLS: GCM mode with key sizes of 128 bits and 256 bits.

## 7.2.5 FCS\_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)

The TOE provides cryptographic signature services using RSA with key sizes between 3072 and 4096 bits as specified in FIPS PUB 186-4 “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”.

- The RSA with key size of 3072 to 4096 is used for signature generation and verification of TLS.

The TOE provides cryptographic signature services using ECDSA with key sizes between 256 bits, 384 bits and 521 bits as specified in FIPS PUB 186-4 “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”.

- The ECDSA with key size 256 bits, 384 bits and 521 bits is used for signature generation and verification of SSH.

The TOE provides cryptographic signature services using RSA with key sizes 4096 bits as specified in FIPS PUB 186-4 “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”.

- The RSA with key size of 4096 is used for signature verification of Secure Update.

## 7.2.6 FCS\_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)

The TOE provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-256, and SHA-384 as specified in FIPS Pub 180-3 “Secure Hash Standard.”, it also meets the ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.

The association of the hash function with other TSF cryptographic functions is:

**Table 7-2 Usage of Hash Algorithm**

Cryptographic Functions	Hash Function
HMAC-SHA-256	SHA-256
TLS Digital signature verification	SHA-256 SHA-384
SSH Digital signature verification	SHA-256
Hash_DRBG	SHA-256

## 7.2.7 FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)

The TOE provides cryptographic keyed hash services using HMAC-SHA-256 according to RFC2104: HMAC, it also complies with the ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”.

**Table 7-3 Specification of Keyed Hash Algorithm**

HMAC function	Key length (bits)	Hash function	Block size (bits)	Output MAC length (bits)
HMAC-SHA-256	256	SHA-256	512	256

## 7.2.8 FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

The TOE implements a deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) which is conformant to [ISO18031] using the DRBG mechanism Hash\_DRBG as specified in [SP800-90A], chap. 10.1.1.

The entropy source is based on hardware (internal noise source). Random numbers from the internal noise source are only used for seeding the DRBG.



Before generating random bits as the cryptographic key, the TOE sets a new seed using at least 256 of entropy.

DRBG parameters are predefined for the TOE and cannot be modified. Prediction resistance is disabled for the DRBG in the TOE.

## **7.2.9 FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1 SSH Client Protocol**

### **7.2.9.1 FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.1**

The TOE implements the SSH protocol that comply with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 4256, 4344, 5647, 5656, 6668.

### **7.2.9.2 FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.2**

Both public key and password authentication modes are supported by SSH client function. Users can use any or both of those modes to login external SSH server successfully.

The supported public key algorithms for authentication include ECC with cryptographic key size of 256-bit, 384-bit and 521-bit. These public key algorithm conforms to FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.5.

### **7.2.9.3 FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.3**

The TOE drops packets greater than 256 KB in an SSH transport connection. Packets of size greater than 35000 bytes and smaller than 256 KB are not dropped. Because of that the TOE may support uncompressed big certificates.

### **7.2.9.4 FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.4**

The SSH client supports the encryption algorithms of aes128-ctr and aes256-ctr, AEAD\_AES\_128\_GCM, AEAD\_AES\_256\_GCM, aes128-gcm@openssh.com and aes256-gcm@openssh.com.

When SSH Client establishes a connection, it will send a list of encryption algorithms to SSH server. SSH Server will check each algorithm in the list one by one. If it finds one algorithm in the list that is also supported by it, this algorithm will be chosen as the encryption algorithm between client and server. If no algorithm in the list is supported by SSH server, the connection will be terminated.

After the encryption algorithm is selected, Server and Client will create a random number and exchange. Client and Server will use their own random number to create an encryption key.

Then, the SSH Client will use its own encryption key to encrypt each packet, and use SSH Server's encryption key to decrypt each packet.

#### 7.2.9.5 FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.5

SSH client function supports the public key algorithm of `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`, `ecdsa-sha2-nistp384`, `ecdsa-sha2-nistp521`.

Before SSHC and SSHS build a connection, they both need to configure a local key-pair that is used for authentication. In Huawei's device, this local key-pair is used for SSH server and SSH client.

The first step to be done/taken when a Client authenticates a Server, is to consult public key algorithms. Client will send a list of public key algorithms to SSH server. SSH Server will check each algorithm in the list one by one. If it finds one algorithm in the list that is also supported by it, this algorithm will be chosen as the public key algorithm between client and server. If no algorithm in the list is supported by SSH server, the connection will be terminated.

#### 7.2.9.6 FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.6

SSH client supports the data integrity algorithms of `hmac-sha2-256`, `AEAD_AES_128_GCM` and `AEAD_AES_256_GCM`.

`AEAD_AES_128_GCM` and `AEAD_AES_256_GCM` will be selected as MAC algorithms when the same algorithm is being used as the encryption algorithm. When `aes*-gcm@openssh.com` is negotiated as the encryption algorithm, the negotiated MAC might be decoded as "implicit".

#### 7.2.9.7 FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.7

SSH client supports the following key exchange algorithm of `ecdh-sha2-nistp256`.

#### 7.2.9.8 FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.8

The SSH connection will be rekeyed after one hour of session time or one gigabyte of transmitted data using that key whichever comes first.

The SSH allows either side to force another run of the key-exchange phase, changing the encryption and integrity keys for the session. The idea is to do this periodically, after one hour of session time or one gigabyte of transmitted data using that key whichever comes first.

#### 7.2.9.9 FCS\_SSHC\_EXT.1.9

The SSH client will authenticate the identity of the SSH server using a local database associating each

host name with its corresponding public key.

## **7.2.10 FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol**

### **7.2.10.1 FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.1**

The TOE implements the SSH protocol that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 4256, 4344, 5647, 5656, 6668.

### **7.2.10.2 FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.2**

Both public key and password authentication modes are supported by SSH server function. The TOE implements the public key algorithms of `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`, `ecdsa-sha2-nistp384` and `ecdsa-sha2-nistp521`.

SSH users can be authenticated in eight modes: ECC, password, password-ECC, and All (any authentication mode of ECC or password is allowed with “ALL” mode). The SSH user that is created by administrators shall be configured to one of the modes. Then the external SSH client can login SSH server successfully via the configured SSH user and authentication mode.

### **7.2.10.3 FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.3**

The TOE drops packets greater than 256 KB in an SSH transport connection. Packets of size greater than 35000 bytes and smaller than 256 KB are not dropped. Because of that the TOE may support uncompressed big certificates.

### **7.2.10.4 FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.4**

SSH server function supports the encryption algorithms of `aes128-ctr`, `aes256-ctr`, `AEAD_AES_128_GCM`, `AEAD_AES_256_GCM`, `aes128-gcm@openssh.com` and `aes256-gcm@openssh.com`.

When SSH Client establishes a connection, it will send a list of encryption algorithms to SSH server. SSH Server will check each algorithm in the list one by one. If it finds one algorithm in the list that is also supported by it, this algorithm will be chosen as the encryption algorithm between client and server. If no algorithm in the list is supported by SSH server, the connection will be terminated.

After the encryption algorithm is selected, Server and Client will create a random number and exchange. Client and Server will use their own random number to create an encryption key.

Then, the SSH server will use its own encryption key to encrypt each packet, and use SSH client's encryption key to decrypt each packet.

### 7.2.10.5 FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.5

SSH server function supports the public key algorithm of `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`, `ecdsa-sha2-nistp384`, `ecdsa-sha2-nistp521`.

Before SSHC and SSHS build a connection, they both need to configure a local key-pair that is used for authentication. In Huawei's device, this local key-pair is used for SSH server and SSH client.

The first step to be done/taken when a Client authenticates a Server, is to consult public key algorithms. Client will send a list of public key algorithms to SSH server. SSH Server will check each algorithm in the list one by one. If it finds one algorithm in the list that is also supported by it, this algorithm will be chosen as the public key algorithm between client and server. If no algorithm in the list is supported by SSH server, the connection will be terminated.

### 7.2.10.6 FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.6

SSH server function supports the data integrity algorithms of `hmac-sha2-256` , `AEAD_AES_128_GCM` and `AEAD_AES_256_GCM`.

`AEAD_AES_128_GCM` and `AEAD_AES_256_GCM` will be selected as MAC algorithms when the same algorithm is being used as the encryption algorithm. When `aes*-gcm@openssh.com` is negotiated as the encryption algorithm, the negotiated MAC might be decoded as "implicit".

### 7.2.10.7 FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.7

SSH server supports the following key exchange algorithm: `ecdh-sha2-nistp256`.

### 7.2.10.8 FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.8

The SSH connection will be rekeyed after one hour of session time or one gigabyte of transmitted data using that key whichever comes first.

The SSH allows either side to force another run of the key-exchange phase, changing the encryption and integrity keys for the session. The idea is to do this periodically, after one hour of session time or one gigabyte of transmitted data using that key whichever comes first.

## **7.2.11 FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication**

### **7.2.11.1 FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.1**

The TLS client supports the following ciphersuites:

- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288

### **7.2.11.2 FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.2**

The reference identifier is established by the user and by an application (a parameter of an API). Based on a singular reference identifier's source domain and application service type (e.g. syslog), the client establishes all reference identifiers including DNS names(case-insensitive) for the Subject Alternative Name field. The client then compares this list of all acceptable reference identifiers to the presented identifiers in the TLS server's certificate.

The TOE doesn't support certificate pinning and use of wildcards in digital certificates. The TOE doesn't support to use IP addresses in digital certificates.

### **7.2.11.3 FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.3**

When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also not implement any administrator override mechanism.

### **7.2.11.4 FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.4**

TLS don't support EC Extension in the Client Hello

## **7.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)**

### **7.3.1 FIA\_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management**

Administrators can configure TOE's session lock time and number of unsuccessful authentication attempts from 3 to 5. When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TOE will prevent the offending remote Administrator from successfully authenticating before the lock time or unlock is taken by a local Administrator or prevent the offending remote Administrator from successfully authenticating until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed.

To ensure account and password security of the administrators, the account locking function is enabled for administrators who fail remote authentication.

When an account logs in to the device within a specified period and the password is incorrect, the number of login failures of the account is recorded. When the number of login failures of the account reaches the upper limit (3 by default), the account is locked (the default locking duration is 5 minutes). After a certain period, the account is unlocked.

### **7.3.2 FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1 Password Management**

The TOE supports the local definition of users with corresponding passwords which are used for security administrators' authentication of local or remote administration connections. The passwords can be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters (not including spaces, question marks or single quotation mark). Minimum password length is settable by the Authorized Administrator, and passwords 8 characters or greater (maximum 128 characters) are supported. Password composition rules specifying the types and number of required characters that comprise the password are settable by the Authorized Administrator. Passwords have a maximum lifetime, configurable by the Authorized Administrator.

### **7.3.3 FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication**

The TOE requires all users to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing execution of any TSF mediated action except display of the banner and ICMP echo service.

Success-logout includes user-name, connect-type, IP-address, authentication-status, and so on.

The TOE supports user login over console or remote interface. Any login method needs authentication before a successful login.

Local access is achieved by console port. Local authentication supports password-based authentication.

Remote access is achieved by SSH. It also supports associated identity authentication of password and public-key. Users can also login with any of the identity authentication modes of password, and ECC when their login mode is configured to be 'ALL'.

### **7.3.4 FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism**

The TOE can be configured to require local authentication or remote authentication as defined in the

authentication policy for interactive (human) users.

The policy for interactive (human) users (Administrators) can be authenticated to the local user database, or have redirection to a remote authentication server. Interfaces can be configured to try one or more remote authentication servers, and then fail back to the local user database if the remote authentication servers are inaccessible.

If the interactive (human) users (Administrators) password is expired, the user is required to create a new password after correctly entering the expired password.

### 7.3.5 FIA\_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback

When a user inputs their password at the local console, the console will not display the input so that the user password is obscured. For remote session authentication, the TOE does not echo any characters as they are entered. The TOE does not provide any additional information to the user that would give any indication about the authentication data.

### 7.3.6 FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation

The TOE supports the verification of the certificate and the certificate path by the rules specified in RFC 5280, using algorithm RSA.

The TOE supports the verification of the revocation status by CRLs as specified in RFC 5280. When the client receives TLS Handshake's Server Certificate message, the client will check validation of the certificates and certificate revocation list. When an administrator imports a certificate, the TOE will check certificate integrity and validation of the certificates.

The TOE validates a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates.

The TSF validates the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:

- Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
- Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
- Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
- OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9

with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.

The TOE does not implement OCSP, so the id-kp-9 is not supported by the TOE. The TOE only acts as a client which only receives Server certificates, so the id-kp-2 is not supported by the TOE. The TOE does not use X509 certificates for the TOE updating, so the id-kp-3 is not supported by the TOE.

### **7.3.7 FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication**

The certificate used by TLS authentication is sent by the TLS server. The CRL should be loaded for certificate validation.

The TOE will send a security log when a connection cannot be established during the validity check of a certificate used in establishing a trusted channel. TLS only supports RSA certificate.

The check of validity of the certificates takes place at the authentication of the TLS connection. When the certificate is valid, we can trust the peer identity and use the certificate to verify the integrity of the message.

TOE chooses a certificate which was configured by CLI for services (such as Syslog).

When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate; the TSF shall not accept the certificate when all other checks pass in FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.

## **7.4 Security management (FMT)**

### **7.4.1 FMT\_MOF.1/ManualUpdate**

The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual updates to Security Administrators.

Only administrators have the right to create or delete local users. When changing the local user privilege level, the configured new level of the local user cannot be higher than that of the login-in user. This way, no user except administrators can change another user to be at the privilege level of administrator. And only administrators have the ability to perform manual update. So the manual update is restricted to administrators. The TOE uses groups to organize users. Different kinds of users are in different groups and every group has a specific level that identifies its roles and scope of rights.



### **7.4.2 FMT\_MOF.1/Functions Management of security functions behaviour**

Only administrators have the privilege to choose a trusted channel for transmitting the audit data to an external IT entity. A user with no administrator privileges cannot configure and enable the info-center function.

### **7.4.3 FMT\_MOF.1/Services Management of security functions behaviour**

Only administrators have ability to enable and disable the functions and services, the other users are disallowed to do it. The functions and services include “info-center loghost”, “undo info-center loghost”, “info-center loghost source”, “undo info-center loghost source” , “sftp server enable”, “undo sftp server enable”, for more please refer to the AGD.

### **7.4.4 FMT\_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data**

Only administrators have privilege to manage the TSF data, the other users are disallowed to do it.

The TOE provides the ability for authorized administrators to access TOE data, such as audit data and configuration data. Each of the predefined and administratively configured users have different rights to access the TOE data.

The access control mechanisms of the TOE are based on hierarchical access levels where a user level is associated with every user and terminal on the one hand, and a command level is associated with every command. Only if the user level is equal or higher to a specific command, authorizes the user to execute this command. Management of security function is realized through commands. So for every management function sufficient user level is required for the user to be able to execute the corresponding command.

### **7.4.5 FMT\_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF data**

Only administrators have the right to delete and/or import the cryptographic keys (such as ecc key, rsa key), the other users are disallowed to do this.

### **7.4.6 FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions**

The TOE provides all the capabilities necessary to securely manage the TOE. The administrative user can connect to the TOE using the CLI to perform these functions via SSH encrypted session.

The management functionality provided by the TOE includes the following administrative functions:

- Ability to manage the TOE locally as well as remotely;
- Ability to configure the access banner;
- Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
- Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to installing those updates;
- Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA\_AFL.1;
- Ability to start and stop services;
- Ability to configure audit behaviour (e.g. changes to storage locations for audit; changes to behaviour when local audit storage space is full);
- Ability to manage the cryptographic keys;
- Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
- Ability to re-enable an Administrator account;
- Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
- Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors;
- Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store;
- Ability to manage the trusted public keys database.

### **7.4.7 FMT\_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles**

A Security Administrator is able to administer the TOE through the local console or through a remote mechanism.

An administrator can create, delete and modify the other users and endow them with a proper level of rights according to the users' roles. The TOE uses groups to organize users. Different kinds of users are in different groups and every group has a specific level that identifies its roles and scope of rights. Every user in one group has the same scope of rights that the group owns. The TOE has 4 default user groups: manage-ug, system-ug, monitor-ug, and visitor-ug.

## **7.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)**

### **7.5.1 FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys)**

The TOE stores all symmetric keys, and private keys in SDRAM that can't be read, copied or extracted by administrators; hence no interface access.

## 7.5.2 FPT\_APW\_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords

The administrator passwords are stored to a configuration file in cryptographic form hashed with salt by SHA-256, including username passwords, authentication passwords, console and virtual terminal line access passwords.

In this manner, the TOE ensures that plaintext user passwords will not be disclosed to anyone through normal interfaces including administrators.

## 7.5.3 FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 TSF testing

The TSF runs a suite of self-tests during initial start-up to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF, including software integration verification by integrity check and the correct operation of cryptographic functions. During initial start-up, software integrity is checked at first. If integrity check is failed, the start-up procedure will stop. Then the correct operation of cryptographic functions is tested. If this testing fails, the start-up procedure will also stop.

Self-tests include cryptographic algorithm known answer test and software integrity test:

- AES Known Answer Test
- HMAC Known Answer Test
- DRBG Known Answer Test
- SHA256/384 Known Answer Test
- RSA Signature Known Answer Test
- DHE Known Answer Test
- ECDH Known Answer Test
- ECDSA Known Answer Test
- Software Integrity Test: The hash value of software is stored in file header, the Integrity Test performs a hash function of the software and compares the result stored in file header.

## 7.5.4 FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 Trusted Update

Only authenticated administrators have the ability to manually initiate an update to TOE firmware/software. During the updating procedure, digital signature as defined at FCS\_COP.1/SigGen will be verified by the TOE at first.

The administrators can query the currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software as well as the most recently installed version by a command. The currently executing patches and most recently installed patches can also be checked out.

The validation of the firmware/software integrity is always performed before the process of replacing a non-volatile, system resident software component with another is initiated. All discrete software components (e.g. applications, drivers, kernel, and firmware) of the TSF are archived together into a whole package and the single package is digitally signed. RSA as specified in FCS COP.1/SigGen can be used for the firmware/software digital signature mechanism to authenticate it prior to installation and that installation fails if the verification fails.

When the digital signature is successfully verified, the new software will be installed successfully and become active when the TOE reboots.

When the digital signature verification fails, the new software will not be installed.

## 7.5.5 FPT\_STM\_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps

Only administrators have the ability to modify the time of TOE, and all modifications affecting time will be recorded. Time accuracy is guaranteed by the administrator for the first time and by the CPU in the long run.

The security functions that make use of time include:

- 1) The calculation of the real time for all audit data.
- 2) The calculation of the validation period of the certificate.

## 7.6 TOE Access (FTA)

### 7.6.1 FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking

An administrator can configure maximum inactivity times for both local and remote administrative sessions. When a session is inactive (i.e., no session input) for the configured period of time, the TOE will terminate the session, flush the screen, and no further activity will be allowed, requiring the administrator to log in (be successfully identified and authenticated) again to establish a new session.

The allowable range is from 0 minutes 0 seconds to 35791 minutes 59 seconds.

### 7.6.2 FTA\_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination

When the remote session is inactive (i.e., no session input) for the configured period of time, the TOE

will terminate the session. By default, the timeout duration is 10 minutes.

### 7.6.3 FTA\_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination

When the initiated administrator or local session is inactive (i.e., no session input) for the configured period of time, the TOE will terminate the session.

The administrator can terminate the interactive session by closing the login window of the device.

### 7.6.4 FTA\_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners

To provide some prompts or alarms to users, an Administrator can use the header command to configure a title on the router. If a user logs in to the router, the title is displayed. An Administrator can specify the title, or specify the title information by using the contents of a file. The same title is displayed same for both local and remote users.

When a terminal (remote or local) connection is activated and someone attempts to log in, the terminal displays the contents of the title that is set by using the header login command. After the successful login, the terminal displays the contents of the title that is configured by using the header shell command.

The local Console port and the remote Secure Telnet interface are used by an administrator to communicate with the router.

## 7.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)

### 7.7.1 FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

The TOE works as the client to protect the communications between the TOE and the Syslog server by using a TLS protocol. When the TOE acts as a client to establish a TLS connection with the Syslog server, the TOE uses the X.509 certificate defined by 6.1.3.7 to identify the audit server.

TLS protects the data from disclosure by encryption defined at 6.1.2.4 and ensures that the data has not been modified by MAC defined by 6.1.2.6.

### 7.7.2 FTP\_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path

All remote administrative communications take place over a secure encrypted SSH session. The remote users are able to initiate SSH communications with the TOE.

The TOE protects communications between the TOE and authorized remote administrators with SSH.



# 8

## Crypto Disclaimer

The following cryptographic algorithms are used by ATN Series Routers software to enforce its security policy:

#	Purpose	Cryptographic Mechanism	Standard of Implementation	Key Size in Bits	Standard of Application	Comments
1	Key Generation	FFC schemes	-	3072-bit or greater	FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.1	FCS_CKM.1
		ECC schemes	-	256 bits or greater	FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4	
2	Key Establishment	Finite field-based key establishment schemes	Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography	3072 bit or greater	NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2	FCS_CKM.2
		Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes	Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography	256 bits	NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2	FCS_CKM.2
3	Confidentiality	AES in GCM mode	-	128 bits or 256 bits	AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, GCM as specified in ISO 19772	FCS_COP.1/ DataEncryption
		AES in CTR mode	-	128 bits or 256 bits	AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, CTR as specified in ISO 10116	

4	Authentication	RSA signature	RSA: PKCS#1_V2.1, RSASSA-PKCS2v1_5	3072 bits to 4096 bits	FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5	FCS_COP.1/ SigGen
			Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3		ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3	
		ECDSA signature	“NIST curves” ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4	256 bits or greater	FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 6 and Appendix D	
5	Secure Update	RSA signature	RSA: PKCS#1_V2.1, RSASSA-PKCS2v1_5	4096 bits	FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5	FCS_COP.1/ SigGen
6	Integrity	SHA-256 and SHA-384	-	256 bits,384 bits	ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004	FCS_COP.1/Hash
7	Cryptographic Primitive	HMAC-SHA-256	-	256 bits	ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2	FCS_COP.1/ KeyedHash
8	Random Bit Generation	Hash_DRBG (any); DRG.2 acc. to SP800-90A	-	256 bits	SP800-90A ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”	FCS_RBG_EXT.1



9	Trusted Channel	SSH V2.0	RFC 4251 RFC 4252 RFC 4253 RFC 4254 RFC 4256 RFC 4344 RFC 5647 RFC 5656 RFC 6668	-	-	FTP_TRP.1/ Admin
		TLS1.2	RFC 5288 RFC 5246 RFC 6125	-	-	FTP_ITC.1
10	Cryptographic Primitive	Generation of prime numbers for RSA	None	-	-	Miller-Rabin-Test is used as primality test.

### Referenced Documents

[FIPS 186-4] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-4, July 2013

[PKCS#1] RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1(RFC3447)

[PKCS#3] A cryptographic protocol that allows two parties that have no prior knowledge of each other to jointly establish a shared secret key over an insecure communications channel.

[FIPS 198-1]The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)--2008 July

[RFC 4251]The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture, January 2006

[RFC 4252]The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol, January 2006

[RFC 4253]The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, January 2006

[RFC 4254]The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, January 2006

[RFC 6668]SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol

[RFC 3268]Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)

[RFC 4346]The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1

[RFC 5246]The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2

[RFC 8446]The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3

[RFC 6125]Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)

[NIST SP 800-56A]National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, May 2013

[NIST SP 800-56B]National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography August 2009

[ISO/IEC 18031:2011] Information technology -- Security techniques -- Random bit generation

[ISO 18033-3] Information technology — Security techniques — Encryption algorithms

[ISO/IEC 9796-2]Information technology -- Security techniques -- Digital signature schemes giving message recovery

[ISO/IEC 9797-2]Information technology -- Security techniques -- Message Authentication Codes (MACs)

[ISO/IEC 10118-3]Information technology -- Security techniques -- Hash-functions

[ISO/IEC 14888-3] Information technology -- Security techniques -- Digital signatures with appendix

# 9 Abbreviations Terminology and References

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## 9.1 Abbreviations

Name	Explanation
AAA	Authentication Authorization Accounting
CA	Certificate Authority
CC	Common Criteria
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
CLI	Command Line Interface
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
EXEC	Execute Command
GUI	Graphical User Interface
IC	Information Center
IP	Internet Protocol
LMT	Local Maintenance Terminal
MAN	Metropolitan Area Network
NDcPP	collaborative Protection Profile for Network Device
NMS	Network Management Server
NTP	Network Time Protocol
PP	Protection Profile

Name	Explanation
<b>RMT</b>	Remote Maintenance Terminal
<b>SFR</b>	Security Functional Requirement
<b>SSH</b>	Secure Shell
<b>SSL</b>	Secure Sockets Layer
<b>ST</b>	Security Target
<b>STP</b>	Spanning-Tree Protocol
<b>TLS</b>	Transport Layer Security
<b>TOE</b>	Target of Evaluation
<b>TSF</b>	TOE Security Functions

## 9.2 Terminology

This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning specific to this document. Terms defined in the [CC] are not reiterated here, unless stated otherwise.

Terminology	Explanation
<b>Administrator:</b>	An administrator is a user of the TOE who may have been assigned specific administrative privileges within the TOE. This ST may use the term administrator occasionally in an informal context, and not in order to refer to a specific role definition – from the TOE’s point of view, an administrator is simply a user who is authorized to perform certain administrative actions on the TOE and the objects managed by the TOE. Since all user levels are assigned to commands and users can only execute a command if their associated level is equal or higher compared to the level assigned to a command, a user might have certain administrative privileges but lacking some other administrative privileges. So the decision whether a user is also an administrator or not might change with the context (e.g. might be able to change audit settings but cannot perform user management).
<b>Operator:</b>	See User.

Terminology	Explanation
<b>User:</b>	A user is a human or a product/application using the TOE which is able to authenticate successfully to the TOE. A user is therefore different to a subject which is just sending traffic through the device without any authentication.

## 9.3 References

Name	Description
[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Part 1-3 April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5
[CC1]	Common Criteria (CC) Part 1: Introduction and general model April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5
[CC2]	Part 2: Security functional components April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5
[CC3]	Part 3: Security assurance components April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Evaluation methodology April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5
[CPP_ND]	collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23-Mar-2020

Name	Description
[ISO18031]	Information technology — Security techniques — Random bit generation Second edition 2011-11-15
[RFC 3526]	This document defines new Modular Exponential (MODP) Groups for the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. It documents the well known and used 1536 bit group 5, and also defines new 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, and 8192 bit Diffie-Hellman groups numbered starting at 14. Please refer to the following link: <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3526">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3526</a>
[RFC 4251]	This document describes the architecture of the SSH protocol, as well as the notation and terminology used in SSH protocol documents. It also discusses the SSH algorithm naming system that allows local extensions. Please refer to the following link: <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4251">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4251</a>
[RFC 5280]	This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. Please refer to the following link: <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280</a>
[RFC 5759]	This document specifies a base profile for X.509 v3 Certificates and X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for use with the United States National Security Agency's Suite B Cryptography. Please refer to the following link: <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5759">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5759</a>
[SD_ND]	Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP December-2019 Version 2.2
[SP800-56A]	Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography Revision 2 May 2013
[SP800-56B]	Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography Revision 1 September 2014

Name	Description
[SP800-90A]	Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators Revision 1 June 2015